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Abstract
We consider a smart grid with an independent system operator (ISO), and distributed aggregators
who have energy storage and purchase energy from the ISO to serve its customers. All the entities in
the system are foresighted: each aggregator seeks to minimize its own long-term payments for energy
purchase and operational costs of energy storage by deciding how much energy to buy from the ISO,
and the ISO seeks to minimize the long-term total cost of the system (e.g. energy generation costs and
the aggregators’ costs) by dispatching the energy production among the generators. The decision making
of the foresighted entities is complicated for two reasons. First, the information is decentralized among
the entities: the ISO does not know the aggregators’ states (i.e. their energy consumption requests
from customers and the amount of energy in their storage), and each aggregator does not know the
other aggregators’ states or the ISO’s state (i.e. the energy generation costs and the status of the
transmission lines). Second, the coupling among the aggregators is unknown to them due to their limited
information. Specifically, each aggregator’s energy purchase affects the price, and hence the payments
of the other aggregators. However, none of them knows how its decision influences the price because
the price is determined by the ISO based on its state. We propose a design framework in which the ISO
provides each aggregator with a conjectured future price, and each aggregator distributively minimizes
its own long-term cost based on its conjectured price as well as its locally-available information. The
proposed framework can achieve the social optimum despite being decentralized and involving complex
coupling among the various entities interacting in the system. Simulation results show that the proposed
foresighted demand side management achieves significant reduction in the total cost, compared to the
optimal myopic demand side management (up to 60% reduction), and the foresighted demand side
management based on the Lyapunov optimization framework (up to 30% reduction).
I. INTRODUCTION
The power systems are undergoing drastic changes on both the supply side and the demand
side. On the supply side, an increasing amount of renewable energy (e.g. wind energy, solar
energy) is penetrating the power systems. The adoption of renewable energy reduces the envi-
ronmental damage caused by conventional energy generation, but also introduces high fluctuation
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2and uncertainty in energy generation on the supply side. To cope with this uncertainty in energy
generation, the demand side is deploying various solutions, one of which is the use of energy
storage [6]. In this paper, we study the optimal demand side management (DSM) strategy in the
presence of energy storage, and the corresponding optimal economic dispatch strategy.
Specifically, we consider a power system consisting of energy generators on the supply side, an
independent system operator (ISO) that operates the system, and multiple aggregators and their
customers on the demand side. On the supply side, the ISO receives energy purchase requests
from the aggregators as well as reports of (parameterized) energy generation cost functions from
the generators, and based on these, dispatches the energy generators and determines the unit
energy prices. On the demand side, the aggregators are located in different geographical areas
and provide energy for residential customers (e.g. households) or for commercial customers
(e.g. an office building) in the neighborhood. In the literature, the term “DSM” has been broadly
used for different decision problems on the demand side. For example, some papers (see [1]–[4]
for representative papers) focus on the interaction between one aggregator and its customers,
and refer to DSM as determining the power consumption schedules of the users. Some papers
[5]–[12] focus on how multiple aggregators [5]–[8] or a single aggregator [9]–[12] purchases
energy from the ISO based on the energy consumption requests from their customers. Our paper
pertains to the second category of research works.
The key feature that sets apart our paper from most existing works [5]–[8] is that all the
decision makers in the system are foresighted. Each aggregator seeks to minimize its long-term
cost, consisting of its operational cost of energy storage and its payment for energy purchase.
In contrast, in most existing works [5]–[8], the aggregators are myopic and seek to minimizing
their short-term (e.g. one-day or even hourly) cost. In the presence of energy storage, foresighted
DSM strategies can achieve much lower costs than myopic DSM strategies because the current
decisions of the aggregators will affect their future costs. For example, an aggregator can purchase
more energy from the ISO than that requested from its customers, and store the unused energy
in the energy storage for future use, if it anticipates that the future energy price will be high.
Hence, the current purchase from the aggregators will affect how much they will purchase
in the future. In this case, it is optimal for the entities to make foresighted decisions, taking
into account the impact of their current decisions on the future. Since the aggregators deploy
foresighted DSM strategies, it is also optimal for the ISO to make foresighted economic dispatch,
3in order to minimize the long-term total cost of the system, consisting of the long-term cost of
energy generation and the aggregators’ long-term operational cost. Note that although some
works [9]–[12] assume that the aggregator is foresighted, they study the decision problem of a
single aggregator and do not consider the economic dispatch problem of the ISO. When there
are multiple aggregators in the system (which is the case in practice), this approach neglects the
impact of aggregators’ decisions on each other, which leads to suboptimal solutions in terms of
minimizing the total cost of the system.
When the ISO and multiple aggregators make foresighted decisions, it is difficult to obtain
the optimal foresighted strategies for two reasons. First, the information is decentralized. The
total cost depends on the generation cost functions (e.g. the speed of wind for wind energy
generation, the amount of sunshine for solar energy generation, and so on), the status of the
transmission lines (e.g. the flow capacity of the transmission lines), the amount of electricity
in the energy storage, and the demand from the customers, all of which may change due to
supply and demand uncertainty. However, none of the entities knows all the above information:
the ISO knows only the generation cost functions and the status of the transmission lines, and
each aggregator knows only the status of its own energy storage and the demand from its own
customers. Hence, the DSM strategy needs to be decentralized, such that each entity can make
decisions solely based on its locally-available information. Second, the aggregators are coupled
in a complicated way that is unknown to them. Specifically, each aggregator’s purchase affects
the prices, and thus the payments of the other aggregators. However, the price is determined by
the ISO based on the generation cost functions and the status of the transmission lines, neither
of which is known to any aggregator. Hence, each aggregator does not know how its purchase
will influence the price, which makes it difficult for the aggregator to make the optimal decision.
To overcome the difficulty resulting from information decentralization and complicated cou-
pling, we propose a decentralized DSM strategy based on conjectured prices. Specifically, each
aggregator makes decisions based on its conjectured price, and its local information on the
status of its energy storage and the demand from its customers. In other words, each aggregator
summarizes all the unavailable information into its conjectured price. Note, however, that the
price is determined based on the generation cost functions and the status of the transmission
lines, which is only known to the ISO. Hence, the aggregators’ conjectured prices are determined
by the ISO. We propose a simple online algorithm for the ISO to update the conjectured prices
4TABLE I
COMPARISONS WITH RELATED WORKS ON DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT.
Energy storage Time horizon Foresighted Aggregators Supply uncertainty Demand Uncertainty
[1][2][5] No 1 day No Multiple No No
[3] No 1 day No Multiple Yes No
[4] No 1 day No Multiple No Yes
[6] Yes 1 day No Multiple No No
[7][8] Yes 1 day No Multiple Yes Yes
[9][10] Yes Infinite Yes Single No Yes
[11][12] Yes Infinite Yes Single Yes Yes
Proposed Yes Infinite Yes Multiple Yes Yes
based on its local information, and prove that by using the algorithm, the ISO obtains the optimal
conjectured prices under which the aggregators’ (foresighted) best responses minimize the total
cost of the system.
A. Related Works on Demand-Side Management
The early works [1]–[5] on demand side management focused on the power consumption
scheduling of the customers in one day. They considered a power system with no demand un-
certainty (e.g. fixed, instead of stochastic, demand) and no supply uncertainty (e.g. no renewable
energy generation). In this simplified model, they formulated the cost minimization problem
[1] or the utility maximization problem [2][5] as a convex optimization problem, and proposed
distributed algorithms to achieve the optimal power consumption scheduling.
However, with the penetration of renewable energy, there is a high degree of uncertainty in
the supply. In addition, the demand cannot be the same for every day. Hence, we need to build
an appropriate model for the power system that takes into account the uncertainty in the supply
and demand. Some works [3] considered such a model with demand and supply uncertainties,
but still focused on the decision problem in one day. Since the users are myopic and optimize its
one-day utility, the problem is formulated as a finite-horizon Markov decision problem (MDP)
and a greedy algorithm is proposed to achieve the optimal solution [3].
Nevertheless, the above works neglected an important trend in the future power system: the
increasing adoption of energy storage on the demand side to cope with the uncertain energy
5TABLE II
COMPARISONS WITH RELATED MATHEMATICAL FRAMEWORKS.
MDP
MU-MDP Lyapunov Optimization Stochastic Control Stochastic Games
This work
[13][14] [9]–[12] [15] [17]
Number of decision makers Single Multiple Single Multiple Multiple Multiple
Decentralized information N/A Yes N/A Yes No Yes
Coupling among users N/A Weak N/A Strong Strong Strong
Optimal Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Constructive Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
supply caused by renewable energy generation. Some works [6]–[8] propose myopic DSM
strategies to minimize the short-term (e.g. one-day or hourly) cost in the presence of energy
storage. However, with energy storage, the strategies that minimize the long-term cost can greatly
outperform the myopic strategies that minimize the short-term cost. For example, in a myopic
strategy, the aggregator may tend to purchase as little power as possible as long as the demand
is fulfilled, in order to minimize the current operational cost of its energy storage. However, the
optimal policy should take into consideration the future price, and balance the trade-off between
the current operational cost and the future saving in energy purchase. Some works [9]–[12]
propose the optimal foresighted DSM strategy in the presence of the energy storage under a
single-aggregator model. In practice, the power system has many aggregators making decisions
that affect each other’s cost. In the practical system with many aggregators, it is inefficient for
each aggregator to simply adopt the optimal foresighted strategy designed for a single-aggregator
model. As we will show in the simulation, in the multiple-aggregator scenario, the total cost
achieved by such a simple adaptation of the optimal single-aggregator strategy is much higher
(up to 30%) than the proposed optimal solution. This is because the single-aggregator strategy
aims at achieving individual minimum cost, instead of the total cost. Due to the coupling among
the aggregators, the outcome in which individual costs are minimized may be very different
from the outcome in which the total cost is minimized.
In Table I, we summarize the above discussions on the existing works in power systems
by comparing them in various aspects. We will provide a more technical comparison with the
existing works in Table VI, after we described the proposed framework.
6B. Related Theoretical Frameworks
Decision making in a dynamically changing environment has been studied and formulated as
Markov decision processes (MDPs). Most MDPs solve for single-user decision problems. There
have been few works [13][14] on multi-user MDPs (MU-MDPs). The works on MU-MDPs
[13][14] focus on weakly coupled MU-MDPs, where the term “weakly coupled” is coined by [13]
to denote the assumption that one user’s action does not directly affect the others’ current payoffs.
The users are coupled only through some linking constraints on their actions (for example, the
sum of their actions, say the sum data rate, should not exceed some threshold, say the available
bandwidth). However, once a user chooses its own action, its current payoff and its state transition
are determined and do not depend on the other users’ actions. In contrast, in this work, the users
are strongly coupled, namely one user’s action directly affect the others’ current payoffs. For
example, one aggregator’s energy purchase affects the unit price of energy, which has impact on
the other aggregators’ payments. There are few works in stochastic control that model the users’
interaction as strongly coupled [15]. However, the main focus of [15] is to prove the existence of
a Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy. There is no performance analysis/guarantee of the proposed
NE strategy.
The interaction among users with strong coupling is modeled in the game theory literature as
a stochastic game [17] in game theory literature. However, in standard stochastic games, the state
of the system is known to all the players. Hence, we cannot model the interaction of entities in
our work as a stochastic game, because different entities have different private states unknown
to the others. In addition, the results in [17] are not constructive. They focus on what payoff
profiles are achievable, but cannot show how to achieve those payoff profiles. In contrast, we
propose an algorithm to compute the optimal strategy profile.
In Table II, we compare our work with existing theoretical frameworks. Note that we will
provide a more technical comparison with the Lyapunov optimization and MU-MDP frameworks
in Table VI, after we described the proposed framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the system model in Section II,
and then formulate the design problem in Section III. We describe the proposed optimal decen-
tralized DSM strategy in Section IV. Through simulations, we validate our theoretical results and
demonstrate the performance gains of the proposed strategy in Section V. Finally, we conclude
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Fig. 1. The system model of the smart grid. The information flow to the ISO is denoted by red dashed lines, the information
flow to the aggregators is denoted by black dotted lines, and the information flow sent from the ISO is denoted by blue dash-dot
lines.
the paper in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We first describe the basic model that will be used in most of the paper, and then discuss
some extensions of the model.
A. The Basic Model
We consider a smart grid with one ISO indexed by 0, G generators indexed by g = 1, 2, . . . , G,
I aggregators indexed by i = 1, 2, . . . , I , and L transmission lines (see Fig. 1 for an illustra-
tion). The ISO schedules the energy generation of generators and determines the unit prices of
energy for the aggregators. The generators provide the ISO with the information of their energy
generation cost functions, based on which the ISO can minimize the total cost of the system.
Since the ISO determines how much energy each generator should produce, we do not model
generators as decision makers in the system; instead, we abstract them by their energy generation
cost functions. Each aggregator, equipped with energy storage, manages the electricity usage in a
small community of residential households or a commercial building, and determines how much
energy to buy from the ISO. In summary, the decision makers (or the entities) in the system
are the ISO and the I aggregators. We denote the set of aggregators by I = {1, . . . , I}. In the
8TABLE III
INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO EACH ENTITY.
Information Known to whom
s0 = (ε, ξ), namely the generation cost functions and the status of the transmission lines the ISO only
si = (di, ei), namely the demand and the amount of energy in storage Aggregator i only
following, we may refer to the ISO or an aggregator generally as entity i ∈ {0}∪I, with entity
0 being the ISO and entity i ∈ I being aggregator i.
As discussed before, different entities have different sets of local information, which are mod-
eled as their states. Specifically, the ISO receives reports of the energy generation cost functions,
denoted by ε = (ε1, . . . , εG), from the generators, and measures the status of the transmission
lines such as the phases, denoted by ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξL), by using the phasor measurement units
(PMUs). We summarize the energy generation cost functions and the status of the transmission
lines into the ISO’s state s0 = (ε, ξ) ∈ S0, which is unknown to the aggregators1. Each aggregator
receives energy consumption requests from its customers, and manages its energy storage. We
summarize the aggregate demand di from aggregator i’s customers and the amount ei of energy
in aggregator i’s storage into aggregator i’s state si = (di, ei) ∈ Si, which is known to aggregator
i only. We assume that all the sets of states are finite. We highlight which information is available
to which entity in Table III.
The ISO’s action is how much energy each generator should produce, denoted by a0 ∈ A0 ⊂
RG+, where A0 is the action set. Each aggregator i’s action is how much energy to purchase from
the ISO, denoted by ai ∈ Ai ⊂ R+, where Ai is the action set. We denote the joint action profile
of the aggregators as a = (a1, . . . , aN), and the joint action profile of all the aggregators other
than i as a−i.
We divide time into periods t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., where the duration of a period is determined by
how fast the demand or supply changes or how frequently the energy trading decisions are made.
In each period t, the entities act as follows (see Fig. 2 for illustration):
• The ISO observes its state s0.
1In some systems, the ISO will provide information about the energy generation cost and the state of the grid for the
aggregators. Our framework still works for this case when the ISO’s state s0 is known to the aggregator, as long as the ISO’s
state is independent of the aggregators’ states.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the interaction between the ISO and aggregator i (i.e. their decision making and information exchange)
in one period.
• Each aggregator i observes its state si.
• Each aggregator i chooses its action ai, namely how much energy to purchase from the
ISO, and tells its amount ai of energy purchase to the ISO.
• Based on its state s0 and the aggregators’ action profile a, the ISO determines the price2
yi(s0,a) ∈ Yi of electricity at each aggregator i, and announces it to each aggregator i. The
ISO also determines its action a0, namely how much energy each generator should produce.
• Each aggregator i pays yi(s0,a) · ai to the ISO.3
The instantaneous cost of each entity depends on its current state and its current action.
Each aggregator i’s total cost consists of two parts: the operational cost and the payment. Each
aggregator i’s operational cost ci : Si×Ai → R is a convex increasing function of its action ai.
An example operational cost function of an aggregator can be
ci(si, ai) = p · 1{ei+ai<di} +mi(ei),
2We do not model the pricing as the ISO’s action, because it does not affect the ISO’s payoff, i.e. the social welfare (this is
because the payment from the aggregators to the ISO is a monetary transfer within the system and does not count in the social
welfare).
3Since we consider the interaction among the ISO and the aggregators only, we neglect the payments from the ISO to the
generators, which are not included in the total cost anyway, because the payments are transferred among the entities in the
system.
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where 1{·} is the indicator function, p > 0 is a large positive number that is the penalty when
the demand is not fulfilled (i.e. when ei + ai < di), and mi(ei) is the maintenance cost of
the energy storage that is convex [6]. Then we write each aggregator i’s total cost, which is
the cost aggregator i aims to minimize, as the sum of the operational cost and the payment,
namely c¯i = ci + yi(s0, ai,a−i) · ai, where a−i is the actions of the other aggregators. Note that
each aggregator’s payments depends on the others’ actions through the price. Although each
aggregator i observes its realized price yi, it does not know how its action ai influences the price
yi, because the price depends on the others’ actions a−i and the ISO’s state s0, neither of which
is known to aggregagtor i.
The energy generation cost of generator g is denoted cg(εg, a0,g), which is assumed to be
convex increasing in the energy production level a0,g. An example cost function can be
cg(εg, a0,g) = (q0,g + q1,g · a0,g + q2,g · a20,g) + qr,g · (a0,g − a−0,g)2,
where a−0,g is the production level in the previous time slot. In this case, the energy generation
cost function of generator g is a vector εg = (q0,g, q1,g, q2,g, qr,g, a−0,g). In the cost function,
q0,g + q1,g · a0,g + q2,g · a20,g is the quadratic cost of producing a0 amount of energy [1][2], and
qr,g · (a0,g − s0,g)2 is the ramping cost of changing the energy production level. We denote the
total generation cost by c0 =
∑G
g=1 cg. The ISO’s cost, denoted c¯0, is then the sum of generation
costs and the aggregators’ costs, i.e. c¯0 =
∑N
i=0 ci.
We assume that each entity’s state transition is Markovian, namely its current state depends
only on its previous state and its previous action. Under the Markovian assumption, we denote
the transition probability of entity i’s state si by ρi(s′i|si, ai). This assumption holds for the ISO
for the following reasons. The ISO’s state consists of the energy generation cost functions and
the status of the transmission lines. For renewable energy generation, the energy generation cost
function is modeled by the amount of available renewable energy sources (e.g. the wind speed
in wind energy, and the amount of sunshine in solar energy), which is usually assumed to be
i.i.d. [3][7][8]. In our model, we relax the i.i.d. assumption and allow the amount of available
renewable energy sources to be correlated across adjacent periods. For conventional energy
generation, the energy generation cost function is usually constant when we do not consider
ramping costs. If we consider ramping costs, we can include the energy production level at the
previous period in the energy generation cost function. For the aggregators, the amount of energy
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left in the storage depends only on the amount of energy in the previous period and the amount
of energy purchases in the current period. The demand of the aggregator is the total demand
of all its customers. Since the number of customers is large, the temporal correlation of each
customer’s energy demand can be neglected in the total demand. For this reason, the demand of
the aggregator is often assumed to be i.i.d. [11][12]. In our model, we relax the i.i.d. assumption
and allow the demand of the aggregator to be temporally correlated across adjacent periods.
We also assume that conditioned on the ISO’s action a0 and the aggregators’ action profile
a, each entity’s state transition is independent of each other. This assumption holds for the ISO,
because the energy generation cost functions and the status of the transmission lines depend on
the environments such as weather conditions, and possibly on the previous energy production
levels when we consider ramping costs, but not on the aggregators’ demand or its energy storage.
For each aggregator, its energy storage level depends only on its own state and action, but not
on the ISO’s or the other aggregators’ states. The demand of each aggregator could potentially
depend on the ISO’s state, because the ISO’s state influences the unit price of energy. However, in
practice, consumers are not exposed to real-time pricing in most cases, and hence are not price-
anticipating (namely they do not determine how much to consume based on their anticipation of
the real-time prices). As a result, it is reasonable to assume that the demand of each aggregator
is independent of the ISO’s and the other aggregators’ states.
B. Discussions and Extensions
1) Non-Stationarity: An important concern in smart grids is that the demand is non-stationary,
namely the demand is significantly higher in peak hours. In this case, the Markovian assumption
on the aggregators’ states would not hold if we used the same definition of state. However, we
can augment the state of each aggregator with a component h that represents the period in one
day. Then the newly-defined state transition is Markovian. Similarly, the difference of demand
in weekdays and weekends can be captured in the same way, where the additional component h
makes the state space even larger. Note that the seasonal changes in demand cannot be modeled
in this way, which would result in a significant increase in the state space and make the model
intractable. However, we can deal with the non-stationarity in such a large time scale by adjusting
the system parameters and recalculating the optimal DSM strategy when the system parameters
change.
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2) Two-Settlement Markets: Many energy markets (such as the New England market and the
PJM market) are two-settlement markets. Specifically, each aggregator predicts the demand in
the next day and submits purchase requests in each period of the next day in advance. In this
case, each aggregator takes actions at two time scales: day-ahead and real-time. We can model
the two-settlement market by modeling the day-ahead purchase as a state of the aggregator, if the
aggregator predicts the future demand based on historical statistics. Specifically, aggregator i’s
state is si = (h, di, di, ei), where h is the period in the day, di is the amount of energy purchased
day-ahead for period h, and di is the real-time demand in period h. The amount di of energy
purchased day-ahead for period h depends on the period h of the day. In this case, aggregator
i only needs to fulfill the residual demand di − di in real time. This approach to model the
two-settlement market is also adopted in [23].
C. The DSM Strategy
At the beginning of each period t, each aggregator i chooses an action based on all the
information it has, namely the history of its private states and the history of its prices. We write
each aggregator i’s history in period t as hti = (s
0
i , y
0
i ; s
1
i , y
1
i ; . . . ; s
t−1
i , y
t−1
i ; s
t
i), and the set of
all possible histories of aggregator i in period t as Hti = St+1i × Y ti . Hence, each aggregator i’s
strategy can be written as pii : ∪∞t=0Hti → Ai. Similarly, we write the ISO’s history in period
t as ht0 = (s
0
0,y
0; s10,y
1; . . . ; st−10 ,y
t−1; st0), where y
t is the collection of prices at period t,
and the set of all possible histories of the ISO in period t as Ht0 = St+10 ×
∏
i∈N Y
t
i . Then
the ISO’s strategy can be written as pi0 : ∪∞t=0Hti → Ai. The joint strategy profile of all the
entities is written as pi = (pi1, . . . , piN). Since each entity’s strategy depends only on its local
information, the strategy pi is decentralized. Among all the decentralized strategies, we are
interested in stationary decentralized strategies, in which the action to take depends only on
the current information, and this dependence does not change with time. Specifically, entity i’s
stationary strategy is a mapping from its set of states to its set of actions, namely pisi : Si → Ai.
Since we focus on stationary strategies, we drop the superscript s, and write pii as entity i’s
stationary strategy.
The joint strategy profile pi and the initial state (s00, s
0
1, . . . , s
0
N) induce a probability distribution
over the sequences of states and prices, and hence a probability distribution over the sequences
of total costs c¯0i , c¯
1
i , . . .. Taking expectation with respect to the sequences of stage-game payoffs,
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we have entity i’s expected long-term cost given the initial state as
C¯i(pi|(s00, s01, . . . , s0I)) = E
{
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=0
(
δt · c¯ti
)}
, (1)
where δ ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor.
III. THE DESIGN PROBLEM
The designer, namely the ISO, aims to maximize the social welfare, namely minimize the long-
term total cost in the system. In addition, we need to satisfy the constraints due to the capacity
of the transmission lines, the supply-demand requirements, and so on. We denote the constraints
by f(s0, a0,a) ≤ 0, where f(s0, a0,a) ∈ RN with N being the number of constraints. We
assume that the electricity flow can be approximated by the direct current (DC) flow model, in
which case the constraints f(s0, a0,a) ≤ 0 are linear in each ai. Hence, the design problem can
be formulated as
minpi
∑
s00,s
0
1,...,s
0
I
{
C0(pi|(s00, s01, . . . , s0I)) +
∑
i∈I
Ci(pi|(s00, s01, . . . , s0I))
}
(2)
s.t. f(s0, pi0(s0), pi1(s1), . . . , piI(sI)) ≤ 0, ∀(s0, s1, . . . , sN).
Note that in the above optimization problem, we use aggregator i’s cost Ci instead of its total
cost C¯i, because its payment is transferred to the ISO and is thus canceled in the total cost. Note
also that we sum up the social welfare under all the initial states. This can be considered as the
expected social welfare when the initial state is uniformly distributed. The optimal stationary
strategy profile that maximizes this expected social welfare will also maximize the social welfare
given any initial state. We write the solution to the design problem as pi? and the optimal value
of the design problem as C?.
IV. OPTIMAL FORESIGHTED DEMAND SIDE MANAGEMENT
In this section, we derive the optimal foresighted DSM strategy assuming that each entity
knows its own state transition probabilities.
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A. The aggregator’s Decision Problem and Its Conjectured Price
Contrary to the designer, each aggregator aims to minimize its own long-term total cost
C¯i(pi|(s00, s01, . . . , s0N)). In other words, each aggregator i solves the following problem:
pii = arg max
pi′i
C¯i(pi
′
i,pi−i|(s00, s01, . . . , s0N)).
Assuming that the aggregator knows all the information, the optimal solution to the above
problem should satisfy the following:
V (s0, si, s−i) = max
ai∈Ai
(1−δ)c¯i(s0, si, ai,a−i)+δ·
∑
s′0,s
′
i,s
′
−i
{
ρ0(s
′
0|s0)
∏
j∈N
ρj(s
′
j|sj, aj)V (s′0, s′i, s′−i)
}
.
Note that the above equations would be the Bellman equations, if the aggregator knew all the
information such as the other aggregators’ strategies pi−i and states s−i, and the ISO’s state s0.
However, such information is never known to the aggregator. Hence, we need to separate the
influence of the other entities from each aggregator’s decision problem.
One way to decouple the interaction among the aggregators is to endow each aggregator with
a conjectured price. In general, the conjecture informs the aggregator of what price it should
anticipate given its state and its action. However, in the presence of decentralized information,
such a complicated conjecture is hard, if not possible, to form. Specifically, aggregator i’s
conjectured price should depend not only on aggregator i’s action and state, but also on the
ISO’s state. Hence, no entity possess all the necessary information to form the conjecture. For
this reason, in this paper, we propose a simple conjecture, namely the price does not depend on
the aggregator’s state and action. In this case, the conjectures can be formed by the ISO based
on its local information and then communicated to the aggregators. Denote the conjectured price
as y˜i, we can rewrite aggregator i’s decision problem as
V˜ y˜i(si) = max
ai∈Ai
(1− δ) [ci(si, ai) + y˜i · ai] + δ ·
∑
s′i
[
ρi(s
′
i|si, ai)V˜ y˜i(s′i)
]
.
Clearly, we can see from the above equations that given the conjectured price y˜i, each aggregator
can make decisions based only on its local information.
In Fig. 3, we illustrate the entities’ decision making and information exchange in the design
framework based on conjectured prices. Comparing Fig. 3 with Fig. 2 of the system without
conjectured prices, we can see that in the proposed design framework, the ISO sends the
conjectured prices to the aggregators before the aggregators make decisions. This additional
15
The ISO announces 
the conjectured prices
t+1
The ISO
observes its state:
The ISO
dispatches the generators
(i.e. chooses       ),
and determines the prices
t+1
Aggregator i 
makes payments
ISO Aggregator i
tt
Aggregator i 
observes its state:
Aggregator i 
makes decisions on 
energy purchase
Fig. 3. Illustration of the entities’ decision making and information exchange in the design framework based on conjectured
prices.
procedure of exchanging conjectured prices allows the ISO to lead the aggregators to the optimal
DSM strategies. Note that the conjectured price is generally not equal to the real price charged
at the end of the period, and is not equal to the expectation of the real price in the future. In
this sense, the conjectured prices can be considered as control signals sent from the ISO to the
aggregators, which can help the aggregators to compute the optimal strategies. In Section V, we
will compare the conjectured price with the expected real price by simulation.
The remaining question is how to determine the optimal conjectured prices, such that when
each aggregator reacts based on its conjectured price, the resulting strategy profile maximizes
the social welfare.
B. The Optimal Decentralized DSM Strategy
The optimal conjectured prices depend on the ISO’s state, which is known to the ISO only.
Hence, we propose a distributed algorithm used by the ISO to iteratively update the conjectured
prices and by the aggregators to update their optimal strategies. The algorithm will converge to
the optimal conjectured prices and the optimal strategy profile that achieves the minimum total
system cost C?.
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At each iteration k, given the conjectured price y˜(k)i , each aggregator i solves
V˜
y˜
(k)
i
i (si) = max
ai∈Ai
(1− δ)
[
ci(si, ai) + y˜
(k)
i · ai
]
+ δ ·
∑
s′i
[
ρi(s
′
i|si, ai)V˜ y˜
(k)
i
i (s
′
i)
]
,
and obtains the optimal value function V˜ y˜
(k)
i
i as well as the corresponding optimal strategy pi
y˜
(k)
i
i
under the current conjectured price y˜(k)i .
Similarly, given the conjectured prices y˜(k)0 ∈ RG, the ISO solves
V˜
y˜
(k)
0
0 (s0) = min
ai∈Ai
(1− δ)
[∑
g
cg(s0, a0) + y˜
(k)T
0 · a0
]
+ δ ·
∑
s′0
[
ρ0(s
′
0|s0, a0)V˜ y˜
(k)
0
0 (s
′
0)
]
,
and obtains the optimal value function V˜ y˜
(k)
i
0 as well as the corresponding optimal strategy pi
y˜
(k)
i
0
under the current conjectured price y˜(k)i .
Then the ISO updates the conjectured prices as follows:
y˜
(k+1)
i =
(
λ(k+1)(s0)
)T · ∂f(s0,a)
∂ai
,
where λ(k+1)(s0) ∈ RN is calculated as
λ(k+1)(s0) =
{
λ(k)(s0) + ∆(k) · f
(
s0, pi
y˜0(k)
0 (s0),
∑
s1
pi
y˜1(k)
1 (s1)
|S1| , . . . ,
∑
sI
pi
y˜I(k)
I (sI)
|SI |
)}+
,
where ∆(k) ∈ R++ is the step size, and {x}+ = max{x, 0}.
Note that in the above update of conjectures, to calculate (the subgradient) λ(k), the ISO
needs to know the average amount of purchase
∑
si
pi
y˜1(k)
i (si)
|Si| from each aggregator i. This requires
additional information exchange from the aggregator to the ISO. Moreover, the aggregator may
not be willing to report such information to the ISO. To reduce the amount of information
exchange and preserve privacy, we propose that the ISO calculates the empirical mean values
of the aggregators’ purchases in the run-time (which results in stochastic subgradients). We
summarize the algorithm in Table IV, and prove that the algorithm can achieve the optimal
social welfare in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The algorithm in Table IV converges to the optimal strategy profile, namely
lim
k→0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
s00,s
0
1,...,s
0
I
{
C0(pi
y˜(k) |(s00, s01, . . . , s0I)) +
∑
i∈I
Ci(pi
y˜(k)|(s00, s01, . . . , s0I))
}
− C?
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 0.
Proof: See the appendix.
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TABLE IV
DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM TO COMPUTE THE OPTIMAL DECENTRALIZED DSM STRATEGY.
Input: Each entity’s performance loss tolerance i
Initialization: Set k = 0, a¯i(0) = 0, ∀i ∈ I, y˜i(0) = 0, ∀i ∈ I ∪ {0}.
repeat
Each aggregator i solves
V˜
y˜
(k)
i (s0)
i (si) = maxai∈Ai(1− δ)
[
ci(si, ai) + y˜
(k)
i (s0) · ai
]
+ δ ·∑s′i
[
ρi(s
′
i|si, ai)V˜ y˜
(k)
i (s0)
i (s
′
i)
]
The ISO solves
V˜
y˜0(k)
0 (s0) = minai∈Ai(1− δ)
[∑
g cg(s0, a0) + y˜0(k)
T · a0
]
+ δ ·∑s′0 [ρ0(s′0|s0, a0)V˜ y˜0(k)0 (s′0)]
Each aggregator i reports its purchase request pi
y˜
(k)
i (s0)
i (si)
The ISO updates a¯i(k + 1) = a¯i(k) + pi
y˜
(k)
i (s0)
i (si) for all i ∈ I
The ISO updates the conjectured prices:
y˜
(k+1)
i (s0) =
(
λ(k + 1)T · ∂f(s0,a)
∂ai
)T
, where ∆(k) = 1
k+1
and
λ(k + 1) =
{
λ(k) + ∆(k) · f
(
s0, pi
y˜0(k)
0 (s0),
a¯1(k+1)
k+1
, . . . , a¯I (k+1)
k+1
)}+
until ‖V˜ y˜
(k+1)
i (s0)
i − V˜
y˜
(k)
i (s0)
i ‖ ≤ i
TABLE V
INFORMATION NEEDED BY EACH ENTITY TO IMPLEMENT THE ALGORITHM.
Entity Information at each step k
The ISO The purchase request pi
y˜
(k)
i (s0)
i (si) of each aggregator
Each aggregator i Conjecture on its price y˜(k)i (s0)
We summarize the information needed by each entity in Table V. We can see that the amount
of information exchange at each iteration is small (O(I)), compared to the amount of information
unavailable to each entity (
∏
j 6=i |Si| states plus the strategies pi−i). In other words, the algorithm
enables the entities to exchange a small amount (O(I)) of information and reach the optimal
DSM strategy that achieves the same performance as when each entity knows the complete
information about the system.
We briefly discuss the complexity of implementing the algorithm in terms of the dimensionality
of the Bellman equations solved by each entity. For each aggregator, it solves the Bellman
equation that has the the same dimensionality as the cardinality of its state space, namely |Si|.
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For each ISO, the dimensionality of its state space is large, because the generation cost functions
ε are a vector of length G and the status of the transmission lines is a vector of length L. However,
the ISO’s decision problem can be decomposed due to the following observation. Note that the
generators’ energy generation cost functions are independent of each other. Then we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 2: Given the conjectured price y˜0(k), the ISO’s value function V˜
y˜0(k)
0 can be calcu-
lated by V˜ y˜0(k)0 (s0) =
∑G
g=1 V˜
y˜0,g(k)
0,g (εg), where V˜
y˜0,g(k)
0,g solves
V˜
y˜0,g(k)
0,g (εg) = min
a0,g
(1− δ) [cg(εg, a0,g) + y˜0,g(k)T · a0,g]+ δ ·∑
ε′g
[
ρ0(ε
′
g|εg, a0,g)V˜ y˜0,g(k)0,g (ε′g)
]
.
Proof: The proof follows directly from Lemma 1 in the appendix.
From the above proposition, we know that the dimensionality of the ISO’s decision problem
is
∑G
g=1 |Eg|, where |Eg| is the cardinality of the set of generator g’s generation cost functions.
The dimensionality increases linearly with the number of generators, instead of exponentially
with the number of generators and transmission lines without decomposition.
C. Learning Unknown Dynamics
In practice, each entity may not know the dynamics of its own states (i.e., its own state
transition probabilities) or even the set of its own states. When the state dynamics are not
known a priori, each entity cannot solve their decision problems using the distributed algorithm
in Table IV. In this case, we can adapt the online learning algorithm based on post-decision state
(PDS) in [20], which was originally proposed for wireless video transmissions, to our case.
The main idea of the PDS-based online learning is to learn the post-decision value function,
instead of the normal value function. Each aggregator i’s post-decision value function is defined
as Ui(d˜i, e˜i), where (d˜i, e˜i) is the post-decision state. The difference from the normal state is that
the PDS (d˜i, e˜i) describes the status of the system after the purchase action is made but before
the demand in the next period arrives. Hence, the relationship between the PDS and the normal
state is
d˜i = di, e˜i = ei + (ai − di).
Then the post-decision value function can be expressed in terms of the normal value function
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as follows:
Ui(d˜i, e˜i) =
∑
d′i
ρi(d
′
i, e˜i − (ai − d˜i)|d˜i, e˜i) · Vi(d′i, e˜i − (ai − d˜i)).
In PDS-based online learning, the normal value function and the post-decision value function
are updated in the following way:
V
(k+1)
i (d
(k)
i , e
(k)
i ) = max
ai
(1− δ) · ci(d(k)i , e(k)i , ai) + δ · U (k)i (d(k)i , e(k)i + (ai − d(k)i )),
U
(k+1)
i (d
(k)
i , e
(k)
i ) = (1− α(k))U (k)i (d(k)i , e(k)i ) + α(k) · V (k)i (d(k)i , e(k)i − (ai − d(k)i )).
We can see that the above updates do not require any knowledge about the state dynamics. It is
proved in [20] that the PDS-based online learning will converge to the optimal value function.
D. Detailed Comparisons with Existing Frameworks
Since we have introduced our proposed framework, we can provide a detailed comparison
with the existing theoretical framework. The comparison is summarized in Table VI.
First, the proposed framework reduces to the myopic optimization framework when we set
the discount factor δ = 0. In this case, the problem reduces to the classic economic dispatch
problem.
Second, the Lyapunov optimization framework is closely related to the PDS-based online
learning. In fact, it could be considered as a special case of the PDS-based online learning when
we set the post-decision value function as Ui(si) = ci(si, ai) + (ei + ai)2 − e2i , and choose the
action that minimizes the post-decision value function in the run-time. However, the Lyapunov
drift in the above post-decision value function depends only on the status of the energy storage,
but not on the demand. In contrast, in our PDS-based online learning, we explicitly considers
the impact of the demand when updating the normal and post-decision value functions.
Finally, the key difference between our proposed framework and the framework for MU-
MDP [13][14] is how we penalize the constraints f(s0, a0,a). In particular, the framework in
[13][14], if directly applied in our model, would define only one Lagrangian multiplier for all the
constraints under different states s0. This leads to performance loss in general [14]. In contrast,
we define different Lagrangian multipliers to penalize the constraints under different states s0,
and potentially enable the proposed framework to achieve the optimality (which is indeed the
case as have been proved in Theorem 1).
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TABLE VI
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROPOSED AND EXISTING THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS.
Framework Relationship Representative works
Myopic δ = 0 [3]
Lyapunov optimization Aggregator i’s post-decision value function Ui(si) = ci(si, ai) + (ei + ai − di)2 − e2i [11][12]
MU-MDP Lagrangian multiplier λ(s0) = λ for all s0 [13][14]
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we validate our theoretical results and compare against existing DSM strate-
gies through extensive simulations. We use the widely-used IEEE test power systems with the
data (e.g. the topology, the admittances and capacity limits of transmission lines) provided by
University of Washington Power System Test Case Archive [21]. We describe the other system
parameters as follows (these system parameters are used by default; any changes in certain
scenarios will be specified):
• One period is one hour. The discount factor is δ = 0.99.
• The demand of aggregator i at period t is uniformly distributed among the interval [di(t
mod 24)−∆di(t mod 24), di(t mod 24)+∆di(t mod 24)]. In other words, the distribu-
tion of demand is time-varying across a day. We let the peak hours for all the aggregators
to be from 17:00 to 22:00. The mean value di(t mod 24) and the range ∆di(t mod 24)
of aggregator i’s demand are described as follows (values are adapted from [22]):
di(t mod 24) =
 50 + (i− 1) · 0.5 MW if t mod 24 ∈ [17, 22]
25 + (i− 1) · 0.5 MW otherwise
(3)
and
∆di(t mod 24) =
 5 MW if t mod 24 ∈ [17, 22]
2 MW otherwise
(4)
• All the aggregators have energy storage of the same capacity 25 MW.
• All the aggregators have the same linear energy storage cost function [6]:
ci(si, ai) = 2 · (ai − di)+,
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namely the maintenance cost grows linearly with the remaining energy level and is inde-
pendent of the amount of charge and discharge.
• We index the energy generators starting from the renewable energy generators. All the
renewable energy generators have linear energy generation cost functions: [22]
cg(a0,g) = g · a0,g,
where the unit energy generation cost has the same value as the index of the generator (these
values are adapted from [22], which cited that the unit energy generation cost ranges from
$0.19/MWh to $10/MWh). Although the energy generation cost function is deterministic,
the maximum amount of energy production is stochastic (due to wind speed, the amount
of sunshine, and so on). The maximum amounts of energy production of all the renewable
energy generators follow the same uniform distribution in the range of [90, 110] MW.
• The rest of energy generators are conventional energy generators that use coal, all of which
have the same energy generation cost function: [6]
cg(a0,g) =
1
2
(a0,g)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
generation cost
+
1
10
(a0,g − a−0,g)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
ramping cost
.
In other words, the conventional energy generators have fixed (i.e. not stochastic) generation
cost functions.
• The status of the transmission lines is their capacity limits. The nominal values of the
capacity limits are the same as specified in the data provided by [21]. In each period, we
randomly select a line with equal probability, and decrease its capacity limit by 10%.
We compare the proposed DSM strategies with the following schemes.
• Centralized optimal strategies (“Centralized”): We assume that there is a central controller
who knows everything about the system and solves the long-term cost minimization problem
as a single-user MDP. This scheme serves as the benchmark optimum.
• Myopic strategies (“Myopic”) [1]–[8]: In each period t, the aggregators myopically mini-
mizes their current costs, and based on their actions, the ISO minimizes the current total
generation cost.
• Single-user Lyapunov optimization (“Lyapunov”) [9]–[12]: We let each aggregator adopt the
stochastic optimization technique proposed in [9]–[12]. Based on the aggregators’ purchases,
the ISO minimizes the current total generation cost.
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Fig. 4. The normalized total cost per hour versus the capacity of the energy storage in the IEEE 14-bus system.
A. Performance Evaluation
Now we evaluate the performance of the proposed DSM strategy in various scenarios.
1) Impact of the energy storage: First, we study the impact of the energy storage on the
performance of different schemes. We assume that all the generators are conventional energy
generators using fossil fuel, in order to rule out the impact of the uncertainty in renewable
energy generation (which will be examined next). The performance criterion is the total cost per
hour normalized by the number of buses in the system. We compare the normalized total cost
achieved by different schemes when the capacity of the energy storage increases from 5 MW to
45 MW.
Fig. 4–6 show the normalized total cost achieved by different schemes under IEEE 14-bus
system, IEEE 30-bus system, and IEEE 118-bus system, respectively. Note that we do not show
the performance of the centralized optimal strategy under IEEE 118-bus system, because the
number of states in the centralized MDP is so large that it is intractable to compute the optimal
solution. This also shows the computational tractability and the scalability of the proposed
distributed algorithm. Under IEEE 14-bus and 30-bus systems, we can see that the proposed
DSM strategy achieves almost the same performance as the centralized optimal strategy. The
slight optimality gap comes from the performance loss experienced during the convergence
process of the conjectured prices. Compared to the DSM strategy based on single-user Lyapunov
optimization, our proposed strategy can reduce the total cost by around 30% in most cases.
Compared to the myopic DSM strategy, our reduction in the total cost is even larger and increases
with the capacity of the energy storage (up to 60%).
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Fig. 5. The normalized total cost per hour versus the capacity of the energy storage in the IEEE 30-bus system.
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Fig. 6. The normalized total cost per hour versus the capacity of the energy storage in the IEEE 118-bus system.
2) Impact of the uncertainty in renewable energy generation: Now we examine the impact
of the uncertainty in renewable energy generation. For a given test system, we let half of the
generators to be renewable energy generators. Recall that the maximum amounts of energy
production of the renewable energy generators are stochastic and follow the same uniform
distribution. We set the mean value of the maximum amount of energy production to be 100 MW,
and vary the range of the uniform distribution. A wider range indicates a higher uncertainty in
renewable energy production. Hence, we define the uncertainty in renewable energy generation
as the maximum deviation from the mean value in the uniform distribution.
Fig. 7 shows the normalized total cost under different degrees of uncertainty in renewable
energy generation. Again, the proposed strategy achieves the performance of the centralized
optimal strategy in the IEEE 14-bus system. We can see that the costs achieved by all the
schemes increase with the uncertainty in renewable energy generation. This happens for the
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Fig. 7. The normalized total cost per hour versus the uncertainty in renewable energy generation in the IEEE 14-bus system.
The aggregators have energy storage of capacity 25 MW and 50 MW, respectively.
following reasons. Since the renewable energy is cheaper, the ISO will dispatch renewable energy
whenever possible, and dispatch conventional energy for the residual demand. However, when
the renewable energy generation has larger uncertainty, the variation in the residual demand is
higher, which results in a higher variation in the conventional energy dispatched and thus a larger
ramping cost. To reduce the ramping cost, the ISO needs to be more conservative in dispatching
the renewable energy, which results in a higher total cost. However, we can also see from the
simulation that when the aggregators have larger capacity to store energy, the increase of the
total cost with the uncertainty is smaller. This is because the energy storage can smooth the
demand, in order to mitigate the impact of uncertainty in the renewable energy generation. This
shows the value of energy storage to reduce the cost.
3) Fairness: Now we investigate how the individual costs of the aggregators are influenced by
the capacity of their energy storage. In particular, we are interested in whether some aggregators
are affected by having smaller energy storage. We assume that half of the aggregators have energy
storage of capacity 50 MW, while the other half have energy storage of much smaller capacity
10 MW. In Fig. 8, we compare the average individual cost of the aggregators with smaller energy
storage and that of the aggregators with larger energy storage. We can see that the average cost
of the aggregators with smaller energy storage does increase with the uncertainty in renewable
energy generation. Hence, the aggregators with higher energy storage have an advantage over
those with smaller energy storage, because they have high flexibility in coping with the price
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Fig. 9. The conjectured prices and the real expected locational marginal prices (LMPs) in IEEE 14-bus and 118-bus systems.
fluctuation.
B. The Conjectured Prices
We compare the conjectured prices with the expected real prices. In our simulation, each
aggregator i’s conjectured price is the conjectured price that the proposed algorithm in Table IV
converges to, namely limk→∞ y˜
(k)
i . We can also calculate the expected real price as follows. The
optimal DSM strategy that the algorithm in Table IV converges to will induce a probability
distribution over the states. In each state, we calculate the locational marginal price (LMP) for
each aggregator based on the actions taken at this state. Then we calculate the expected LMP of
each aggregator, which is the expected real price at which each aggregator pays for the energy.
In Fig. 9, we show the highest conjectured price among all the aggregators and the lowest
expected real price among all the aggregators, because it is infeasible to plot the prices for all
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the aggregators in the figure. Hence, the difference of the conjectured price and the real expected
price for each individual aggregator is no larger than the difference shown in the figure. First,
as we can see from the figure, the prices go down when the capacity of the energy storage
increases. This is because with energy storage, the congestion due to high energy purchase
demand decreases, which in turn decreases the congestion cost (technically, the Lagrangian
multiplier associated with the capacity constraint is smaller). Second, in our simulations (not
shown in the figure), we observe that the conjectured prices are always higher than the expected
real prices. Hence, the conjectured price gives each aggregator an overestimate of the real
expected price. An overestimate is better than an underestimate, in the sense that each aggregator
has a guarantee of how much it will pay in the worst case. Finally, we can see from the figure
that the conjectured price is close to the real expected price. The maximum difference between
these two prices is less than 20% in all the considered scenarios.
C. Comparisons of the DSM strategies
In this section, to better understand why the proposed DSM strategies outperform the other
strategies, we present a simple example and illustrate why the proposed strategy achieves a lower
cost. To keep the illustration simple, we reduce the number of states. Specifically, we assume
that the demand has three states: “high”, “medium”, “low”, which corresponds to the highest,
medium, and lowest values of the uniform distribution described in (3)(4). Similarly, the energy
storage has three states: “empty”, “half”, and “full”. The maximum capacity of the renewable
energy generator has two values, corresponding to the highest and lowest values in the uniform
distribution described in the basic simulation setup at the beginning of Section V. To distinguish
the description of the demand state, we suppose that the renewable energy generator harnesses
solar energy, and refer to its states as “sunny” and “cloudy” instead of “high” and “low”. We
do not assume any randomness in the transmission lines. The purchase from each aggregator is
also quantized into three levels: large, moderate, and small.
In Table VII, we compare the actions chosen by different strategies under different states
in an IEEE 14-bus system. Due to space limitation, we cannot show the strategies of all the
aggregators, but only one of them. The state is a three tuple that consists of the demand, the
energy storage, and the renewable energy generation capacity. Although we have reduced the
number of states, there are still 3×3×2 = 18 states, which is hard to show in one table. Instead,
27
TABLE VII
COMPARISONS OF DIFFERENT STRATEGIES.
State (high,full,sunny) (high,full,cloudy) (low,full,sunny) (low,empty,sunny) (high,empty,cloudy) (high,empty,sunny)
Myopic small small small small large large
Lyapunov large small large large small large
MU-MDP large small small small small large
Proposed large low moderate moderate low large
we only show the actions in some representative states, in which different strategies take very
different actions.
First, we can observe that the myopic strategy takes actions based on the demand and the
energy storage exclusively. The myopic strategy aims to minimize the current operational cost
of the energy storage as long as the demand can be satisfied. Hence, it chooses to purchase
small amount of energy as long as the demand can be fulfilled by the energy left in the storage.
Second, as we discussed at the end of Section IV, the strategy based on Lyapunov optimization
does not take into account the demand dynamics. As we can see from the table, the strategy
based on Lyapunov optimization takes actions based on the energy storage and the renewable
energy generation capacity exclusively. It will purchase large amount of energy as long as it is
sunny (which means that the capacity of the renewable energy generator is high and hence the
price is low). In contrast, the proposed strategy considers all the three states when making deci-
sions. For example, when the states are (low,empty,sunny) and (high,empty,sunny), the strategy
based on Lyapunov optimization always chooses to purchase large amount of energy, while the
proposed strategy will purchase moderate amount of energy when the demand is low. Finally,
the strategy based on MU-MDP also considers all the three states, and takes similar actions
as the proposed strategy. However, the strategy based on MU-MDP takes more conservative
actions (e.g. purchases small amount of energy when the proposed strategy purchases moderate
amount of energy). This is because there is only one Lagrangian multiplier under all the states,
and to ensure the feasibility of the constraints, the Lagrangian multiplier has to be set larger.
This results in a harsher penalty in the objective function. Hence, the actions taken are more
conservative to ensure that the line capacity constraints are satisfied.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a methodology to perform optimal foresighted DSM strategies that
minimize the long-term total cost of the power system. We overcame the hurdles of information
decentralization and complicated coupling in the system, by decoupling the entities’ decision
problems using conjectured prices. We proposed an online algorithm for the ISO to update
the conjectured prices, such that the conjectured prices can converge to the optimal ones,
based on which the entities make optimal decisions that minimize the long-term total cost.
We prove that the proposed method can achieve the social optimum, and demonstrate through
simulations that the proposed foresighted DSM significantly reduces the total cost compared
to the optimal myopic DSM (up to 60% reduction), and the foresighted DSM based on the
Lyapunov optimization framework (up to 30% reduction).
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Due to limited space, we give a detailed proof sketch. The proof consists of three key steps.
First, we prove that by penalizing the constraints f(s0, a0,a) into the objective function, the
decision problems of different entities can be decentralized. Hence, we can derive optimal
decentralized strategies for different entities under given Lagrangian multipliers. Then we prove
that the update of Lagrangian multipliers converges to the optimal ones under which there is no
duality gap between the primal problem and the dual problem, due to the convexity assumptions
made on the cost functions. Finally, we validate the calculation of the conjectured prices.
First, suppose that there is a central controller that knows everything about the system. Then
the optimal strategy to the design problem (2) should result in a value function V ∗ that satisfies
the following Bellman equation: for all s0, s1, . . . , sI , we have
V ∗(s0, s) = maxa0,a
(1− δ) ·
I∑
i=0
ci(si, ai) + δ ·
∑
s′0,s′
ρ(s′0, s
′|s0, s, a0,a)V ∗(s′0, s′)
 (5)
s.t. f(s0, a0,a) ≤ 0.
Defining a Lagrangian multiplier λ(s0) ∈ RN+ associated with the constraints f(s0, a0,a) ≤ 0,
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and penalizing the constraints on the objective function, we get the following Bellman equation:
V λ(s0, s) = maxa0,a
{
(1− δ) ·
[
I∑
i=0
ci(si, ai) + λ
T (s0) · f(s0, a0,a)
]
(6)
+δ ·
∑
s′0,s′
ρ(s′0, s
′|s0, s, a0,a)V λ(s′0, s′)
 .
In the following lemma, we can prove that (6) can be decomposed.
Lemma 1: The optimal value function V λ that solves (6) can be decomposed as V λ(s0, s) =∑I
i=0 V
λ
i (si) for all (s0, s), where V
λ
i can be computed by entity i locally by solving
V
λ(s0)
i (si) = maxai
{
(1− δ) · [ci(si, ai) + λT (s0) · fi(s0, ai)]+ δ ·∑s′i ρi(s′i|si, ai)V λi (s′i)} . (7)
Proof: This can be proved by the independence of different entities’ states and by the
decomposition of the constraints f(s0, a0,a). Specifically, in a DC power flow model, the
constraints f(s0, a0,a) are linear with respect to the actions a0, a1, . . . , aI . As a result, we
can decompose the constraints as f(s0, a0,a) =
∑I
i=0 fi(s0, ai).
We have proved that by penalizing the constraints f(s0, a0,a) using Lagrangian multiplier
λ(s0), different entities can compute the optimal value function V
λ(s0)
i distributively. Due to the
convexity assumptions on the cost functions, we can show that the primal problem (2) is convex.
Hence, there is no duality gap. In other words, at the optimal Lagrangian multipliers λ∗(s0),
the corresponding value function V λ∗(s0)(s0, s) =
∑I
i=0 V
λ∗(s0)
i (si) is equal to the optimal value
function V ∗(s0, s) of the primal problem (5). It is left to show that the update of Lagrangian
multipliers converge to the optimal ones. It is a well-known result in dynamic programming that
V λ(s0) is convex and piecewise linear in λ(s0), and that the subgradient is f(s0, a0,a). Note
that we use the sample mean of a0 and a, whose expectation is the true mean value of a0 and
a. Since f(s0, a0,a) is linear in a0 and a, the subgradient calculated based on the sample mean
has the same mean value as the subgradient calculated based on the true mean values. In other
words, the update is a stochastic subgradient descent method. It is well-known that when the
stepsize ∆(k) = 1
k+1
, the stochastic subgradient descent will converge to the optimal λ∗.
Finally, we can write the conjectured prices by taking the derivatives of the penalty terms.
For aggregator i, its penalty is λT (s0) · fi(s0, ai). Hence, its conjectured price is
∂λT (s0)·fi(s0,ai)
∂ai
= λT (s0) · ∂fi(s0,ai)∂ai . (8)
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